The Braves’ Left Field Problem Isn’t Going Away
Five years of failed fixes, from Kelenic to Profar to Yastrzemski — and no clear answer
Before it was Braves Country, it was something else entirely.
The land that Truist Park now sits on has a much longer history than the one that started in 2017. The remnants of the Cherokee and Muscogee Creek people who called this part of North Georgia home have been paved over, built on, and largely forgotten.
Except, maybe, for one spot.
I’m not saying there’s an ancient burial mound under left field at Truist Park.
But if there were, it would explain a lot about how the Braves have handled that position.
It’s been the most persistent problem area for the Braves this decade. And despite two high-dollar signings at the position, there are no signs that the Braves have finally figured it out. Let’s talk about it.
How bad has it been?
When you look at all 30 MLB teams from 2021 through 2026 by total WAR produced by their hitters, Atlanta rates very highly amongst their peers: 5th in that span, with 138.6 fWAR. The only teams above them are the Los Angeles Dodgers (two World Series wins in this span), Toronto Blue Jays (one WS appearance), the Houston Astros (two appearances, one win), and the New York Yankees (one appearance).
But when you isolate it to just left field, Atlanta’s 28th in the sport. The team’s left fielders have combined for an 87 wRC+ and .228/.287/.398 line during this span, with virtually every combination of players failing to get it done.
2021
.230/.312/.429 w/ 29 homers, mostly from Marcell Ozuna, Abraham Almonte, Adam Duvall, Eddie Rosario, and Orlando Arcia
2022
.238/.285/.431 w/ 28 homers mostly from Marcell Ozuna, Eddie Rosario, Adam Duvall, and Robbie Grossman
2023
.254/.297/.460 w/ 28 homers almost entirely from Eddie Rosario and Kevin Pillar. (Ozuna, Sam Hilliard, and Forrest Wall combined for 21 plate appearances in LF)
2024
.229/.278/.364 w/ 18 homers mostly from Jarred Kelenic, Adam Duvall, Ramon Laureano, and Eddie Rosario.
2025
.227/.309/.356 w/ 17 homers mostly from Jurickson Profar, Alex Verdugo, and Eli White.
2026
.210/.291/.314 w/ 1 homer from Mike Yastrzemski, Mauricio Dubón, and Eli White
While it’s too early to write off 2026, that’s still a stunning amount of ineptitude over the past five seasons.
The Braves thought they’d finally figured it out
Unlike their approach at virtually any other position, Atlanta’s front office threw money at this problem multiple times in the last few offseasons, hoping to finally get some reliably average performance from left field for once.
They traded for Jarred Kelenic on the eve of the 2023 Winter Meetings, taking on roughly $20 million in salary to get control of the former top prospect for up to four years. Kelenic produced exactly zero WAR for the Braves across two seasons before being sent to Triple-A and eventually released. He’s currently in the Chicago White Sox minor league system, where the 26-year-old is hitting .190/.343/.468.
They signed Jurickson Profar to a three-year, $42M deal in February of 2024, but have paid him only $6.2M of the $30M owed for his first two seasons due to two separate suspensions by MLB for performance-enhancing drugs. In the games he has played, he’s hit .245/.353/.434. The problem is that’s only 80 games across two seasons.
This winter, they signed Mike Yastrzemski to a two-year, $23M contract and have so far received a .188/.266/.247 line for their troubles.
Kelenic’s been released. Profar, who won’t be back until next season at the earliest, is a candidate to be released as soon as his suspension concludes after this season. But what’s wrong with Yastrzemski?
Is this the aging curve or a slow start?
Playing almost exclusively left field, Yastrzemski’s performance in the regular season hasn’t come close to matching what he accomplished in spring training. So far this season, he has a -6 Batting Run Value, putting him in the bottom ten percent of all qualified hitters in MLB. His .188 batting average and .247 slug aren’t fluky, as his expected batting average based on his batted ball profile is only a .203 and his xSLG is a .270. He has a 3.3% barrel rate, among the bottom 16% in the sport, and is striking out an astounding 26.6% of the time, the worst mark of his career.
The interesting part of the batted ball profile is that he’s still getting good exit velocities (91.0 mph average) and his hard-hit rate is even better than last year, sitting at 46.9%. The power is still there, but he’s struggling to get balls in the air.
Yastrzemski’s career groundball rate is 35.3%. But right now, he’s sitting at 51.7%.
Is this age-related decline or not? That’s not as certain, but I’m inclined to think not.
Looking at the mechanical aspects of his swing - swing speed, his stance, etc, there’s not much that’s changed.
On swing speed, he’s averaging the same speed this season (70.6 mph) as he did in the second half of 2023, when the system came online. That’s down from last season’s 71.2 mph, dropping him from 36th to 29th percentile. His swing is slightly shorter, though, so it’s essentially a wash.
Yastrzemski is using the same stance, slightly open (4°), although he’s set up slightly farther away from the pitcher in the box by about one inch. He’s still using the same toe tap as last year, which appears to be a timing mechanism. Here’s a shot of him with the Giants last season, showing the toe tap.
And here’s Yaz this season, getting rung up on an inside pitch in a similar spot as the homer for San Francisco:
Similar locations, drastically different results.
And the difference shows up there - the pitch recognition and how it’s driving his swing decisions. Yaz’s 2025 homer was off of an inside four-seamer, while he got rung up on a front door changeup. Yaz is taking more pitches that are strikes this season, with his zone swing down to a career worst 58.6%.
(Offspeed hasn’t actually been the issue; in an incredibly small sample size, Yaz is actually performing the exact same against soft stuff as last year. It’s spin and velocity that has him confounded, with Yastrzemski hitting just .176 against fastballs and .167 against breaking balls.)
He’s also chasing significantly more against those two pitch groups, the highest marks of his career, and the resulting chase contact is suboptimal.
So, to recap: Yastrzemski is chasing more (22% to 29.3%), especially against breaking balls and elevated fastballs. That’s led to more whiffs and suboptimal contact, which is wiping out his power.
I don’t think this is age-related decline; I think this is bad swing decisions and a player that appears to be pressing as he’s trying to both get out of a funk and establish himself on the first significant free agent contract of his career.
So what’s actually going on here?
At some point, this stops being about individual players.
Jarred Kelenic didn’t work. Jurickson Profar didn’t work. Mike Yastrzemski, at least so far, isn’t working. The names change, the profiles change, the acquisition methods change — and the result stays the same.
That’s what makes this feel less like bad luck and more like something structural.
Because this isn’t a team that struggles to develop hitters. It isn’t a team that struggles to identify talent. They’ve been one of the best offenses in baseball over this same stretch.
But left field? It’s been a revolving door of mismatched profiles.
Kelenic was a former top prospect they hoped to unlock.
Profar was a high-floor on-base bat.
Yastrzemski was a veteran with a stable, well-understood profile.
Three completely different bets.
Same outcome.
The Bigger Picture
This is where the question shifts.
It’s not just “why isn’t Yastrzemski hitting?” He will eventually. It’s “why does this keep happening here?”
Because at some point, you have to wonder if the issue isn’t the players, but rather the role.
Left field has become a place where the Braves have tried to patch holes from the outside rather than develop a long-term answer from within. A spot where they’ve chased competence instead of locking in certainty.
And when you do that long enough, you end up here.
Maybe Yastrzemski figures it out. The underlying data suggests he could. If the swing decisions normalize, the power probably comes back with it.
But even if he does, the bigger question doesn’t go away.
Because until the Braves actually solve left field from within, preferably by developing their own hitter for the spot, this will keep happening.
And at that point, you don’t need a curse to explain it. You just need a pattern.