The first draft of this newsletter spent 235 words trying to make the Brett Favre trade from the Atlanta Falcons to the Green Bay Packers into an analogy.
I was originally looking for a warning in the Falcons trading away a young quarterback who went on to be a Hall of Famer elsewhere, feeling like that was useful to anyone eager to run Ronald Acuña Jr. out of town this winter.
But the more I thought about it, the comparison kinda falls apart under inspection, right?
The mistake with Favre was that the Falcons gave up on him before they realized he could be a Hall of Fame-caliber quarterback.1
But that’s not where Ronald Acuña Jr. is right now. We know what he can be: an MVP-caliber talent.
The Braves watched him hit 41 home runs, steal 73 bases, and win a unanimous MVP award in 2023. Keeping Acuña isn’t banking on a projection model’s output about what he can be; they’ve seen the best-case outcome with their own eyes (and record books).
But trading Acuña now would also represent a different kind of mistake: allowing an injury-disrupted three-year stretch to convince the front office that the MVP-caliber player they once built their entire lineup around is gone and never coming back, and selling the possibility of a return to another team at a discount.
MLB Network’s Jon Morosi reported on Monday that the Braves will not entertain offers for Acuña this winter, and are refusing to even engage with teams that call to inquire about trading for the right fielder.
Good.
Let’s talk about it.
Why this conversation exists
Ronald’s legs are made out of dry-rotted rubber bands, essentially.
That 2023 season was magical, with Ronald being the first player to break 50 stolen bases in a 40-homer season, never mind 70. He led all of baseball in on-base percentage (.416), runs scored (149), hits (217), and total bases (383), while leading the National League in several others like OPS (1.012).
It was also only the second time in his career he played more than 120 games, and the last time he’s done it. The Braves have gotten just 251 games of Acuña in the three seasons since the MVP campaign, with a second season-ending knee injury and recurring lower-body trouble sapping his availability.
The 2026 season was the most frustrating of the three. After his exemplary return from injury in 2025, he played in just 107 games while hitting .255/.345/.451, a respectable-for-anyone-else .796 OPS, with 20 homers and 21 stolen bases. He was atrocious in the postseason, going just 3-for-24 with no extra-base hits.
To make matters worse, his already-poor defensive performance continued to deteriorate. Ronald’s never had good initial reads off the bat or a decent first step, but he set new career-worsts in several components of the outfield jump2, with a -1.8 ft reaction versus the average right fielder and a -1.9 ft burst.
And to top all that off, he’s entering his age-29 season with just two years of potential team control remaining.
To be clear, the people who are proposing to trade Acuña this offseason are responding to a legitimate deterioration in his performance and availability. I don’t begrudge them at all for thinking that way.
I just happen to think it would be a mistake. Assuming that identifying the risk automatically means selling the player is the correct move is the mistake here.
Acuña doesn’t have to be the 2023 version again
There were a lot of weird things about that 2023 season. Acuña’s MVP performance was fueled, in part, by a one-year cut in his strikeout rate by more than half, from his usual low-20% to just 11.4%. He ran a 23.6% strikeout rate for two consecutive seasons, cut it to just 11.4% in 2023, and then was back up to 23.9% the very next season.
It wasn’t just Ronald, though; the entire Braves team was on a season-long heater at the plate. Atlanta had 307 home runs, tying the all-time single-season record, and became the first team in MLB history to finish with a team slugging percentage over .500. Their 947 runs scored is 13th in the Modern Era and was the highest total for any single team since the 2007 Yankees scored 968.
The Braves don’t need that version of Ronald Acuña Jr. back to make keeping him the correct decision. That’s the ceiling, but his usual season is still pretty strong.
Across the past two seasons, he’s hit .271/.379/.481 with a 138 OPS+. While his 2026 season wasn’t anything to write home about, as we detailed above, he did have a .997 OPS over his final 26 regular-season games.
But even his performance the last two seasons is really good, especially in this free agent market. Here’s how Ronald’s “diminished” production of 2025 and 2026 compares against some of the best names available this winter, guys that Braves fans (and podcasters) have been clamoring for the team to sign:
Ronald Acuña Jr. .271/.379/.481, 138 OPS+
Randy Arozarena: .259/.357/.454, 133 OPS+
Seiya Suzuki: .257/.346/.476, 128 OPS+
The outcomes of keeping Ronald aren’t “2023 MVP version” or “unplayable bum”; there’s an enormous range between those two extremes, and most versions of Ronald on that spectrum would still improve the Braves lineup.
His contract makes being patient palatable
The Braves officially picked up Ronald’s club option for 2027 just two weeks ago, guaranteeing the outfielder $17M in 2027. They have another club option on him for 2028 at that same $17M.
This isn’t a burdensome, high-dollar and long-term contract the Braves need to get out from under. Five different Braves made more than Acuña last year, and his current contract is over after 2028 if the Braves pick up the second club option.
By contrast, the FanGraphs free agent projections for players with similar 2026 production in Arozarena and Suzuki are $23M and $27M, respectively, and both are expected to decline their qualifying offers, as well. The Braves would have to pay more money over more years while also surrendering both their 2nd and 5th highest draft picks next summer plus $1M from their international bonus pool.
I’d argue that this is the perfect place to be if you’re Atlanta, absent a below-market extension. If Ronald declines further (or suffers another catastrophic injury), they can reassess before deciding on their 2028 option. If he rebounds, they’re getting impact production better than the projections for either of those free agents at a significant discount on their likely free-agent cost.
But there’s another problem with trading away Ronald Acuña Jr.: what it does to the roster around him.
Trading Acuña would deepen the roster’s existing problems
This offense was not good for long stretches of this season, with Alex Anthopoulos admitting that they were “streaky” at best, lacking the on-base ability to sustain a high floor.
Their best hitter at drawing a walk, even in a down year for him? Ronald Acuña Jr., at 11.3%. Only one other hitter with 300 or more PAs was even in double digits, with Mike Yastrzemski sitting at 10.0%.
It was also a lefty-heavy lineup, with three of their top four hitters (by wRC+) being lefties in Drake Baldwin (126), Matt Olson (122), and Michael Harris II (121). The only right-handed hitter to have a wRC+ over 100 was Ronald Acuña Jr., at 120.
The lineup was one of MLB’s worst at stealing bases, finishing 23rd with just 83. Ronald Acuña Jr. was just one of three Braves to break double digits, swiping 21 bags by himself. The next-closest Braves hitter was Michael Harris II with 12.
In a poor free agency class for hitters, led by Suzuki and Arozarena, there’s just no easy way to replace the on-the-field production that even a “down year” of Acuña can give you.
And a trade doesn’t immediately make things easier. Trading him for prospects means subtracting from a roster that is in the midst of a competitive window, with an elder statesman ace in Chris Sale. It’s just very difficult for a prospect package to both replace the potential ceiling and replace his immediate production, even in a “down” season.
But at the same time, trading him for a veteran would require finding a team willing to give up a healthier, similarly productive player without demanding additional value. That’s not a very large list, and most of them are on much larger contracts than Acuña’s.
If Atlanta traded Acuña, how much of the return would immediately have to be spent replacing the production it just shipped out the door?
The trade-value paradox
Listen, Alex Anthopoulos has indicated that no player is literally untouchable, saying “everyone has a price.” And if an organization makes an irrational offer, the Braves should obviously consider it.
But teams calling the Braves wouldn’t be paying for his 2023 MVP season. Just like we are, they’d emphasize the knee surgeries, hamstring injuries, continued defensive decline, and limited team control when crafting their offers.
They’d be asking Atlanta to sell when Acuña’s perceived value is lowest, hoping to “buy the dip” and get a rebound out of Acuña over the next two seasons.
The Braves can’t decide to trade Acuña as though the MVP version is gone and not coming back, while at the same time demanding the acquiring team pay them as though that MVP might return.
What Atlanta should actually do
Keeping Acuña on the roster doesn’t mean ignoring the obvious health risk, or pretending that it’s gone. The Braves should treat him as an impact hitter with an unreliable workload: use DH and planned rest strategically, moderate his baserunning when the metrics indicate his body needs it, and stop building a lineup that requires him to play 150+ games in order to function.
Put Ronald Acuña Jr. on the Chris Sale “extra rest” plan is what I’m saying.
That last point’s the big one for me. Acuña’s injuries and offensive slumps this season contributed to Atlanta ranking 26th with a .679 OPS from its right-handed hitters. Even with Jurickson Profar’s expected return to left field, the Braves need to add another right-handed bat capable of protecting the lineup’s lefties when Acuña, Austin Riley, or Sean Murphy are either unavailable or ineffective.
But this is a roster-depth problem, not a reason to trade the player that can fix all those problems when he’s healthy.
The verdict
The Braves don’t know if the 2023 version of Ronald Acuña Jr. is ever coming back. Neither does anyone else.
But another team isn’t calling unless it believes there’s something left to recover, and it isn’t going to compensate Atlanta fully for that possibility. At $17 million, the Braves should keep that bet for themselves.
Call that blind loyalty if you want. I think it’s just refusing to sell low.
For the record, head coach Jerry Glanville later said that off-the-field factors drove the trade, with Favre’s constant abuse of alcohol and drugs a problem that Favre physically being in Atlanta was exacerbating. Sending him to Green Bay, a town “where at 9:00 at night the only thing that’s open is Chili Joes”, was the only way to salvage his career.
Statcast breaks outfield jump down into feet traveled relative to league average within two windows. The first window is the first 1.5 seconds after the ball leaves the pitcher’s hand. The second window is the next 1.5 seconds. Here are the relevant terms:
Reaction: Feet covered in any direction during the first 1.5 seconds, relative to league average.
Burst: Feet covered in any direction from 1.6 to 3.0 seconds, relative to average.
Route: Feet covered against the direct route to the ball in the first three seconds, relative to average.
Feet vs Avg: Feet covered against the direct route to the ball in the first three seconds, relative to average. That is, reaction plus burst plus route.
Feet Covered: Total feet covered against the direct route to the ball in the first three seconds (not relative to average).
If you're going to keep him, then coach him. This guy has the lowest baseball IQ north of Little League. He can't be wasting ABS challenges because of his pride, and if he's too hurt to hussle be satisfied to let him sit on the bench.
Me, i would rather have my Draft Choices and my International Bonus Money.
3 good drafts in a Row !!! This guy, Ronit Shah, is a Difference Maker !!!
Let's not take Draft Choices away from him.